By Vipul Tamhane
Pakistan’s latest crisis began when the BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army) launched an attack lasting nearly two full days. Fire tore through parts of the city while armed groups moved across key zones. Though officials insist on progress against extremist networks, evidence suggests otherwise; state tactics often mirror those they denounce. Instead of dismantling militant structures, responses tend to reinforce them through similar methods. What looks like a strategy might simply be hypocrisy dressed as necessity. Using one violent faction to weaken another rarely ends cleanly. Outcomes repeat the same cycle, feeding instability rather than ending it.
Reports from the area indicate attempts by Pakistan’s military and intelligence figures to use factions such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Islamic State Khorasan Province against Baloch insurgents and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Despite possible exaggeration, claims of 200 losses among Pakistani forces during the BLA's "Operation Herof Phase 2" point to serious damage within its security ranks. What stands out is how Islamabad’s reliance on militant proxies has unraveled in dramatic fashion.
The proxy playbook
Hardly surprising, Pakistan leans on jihadist factions as tools of national strategy. Decades unfold with Islamabad balancing close ties to militants, seeing them as leverage in unbalanced conflicts. Instead of direct engagement, outfits such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) grow under quiet support, fighting shadow wars across Kashmir and Afghanistan. Through these proxies, goals shift without clear accountability, letting geopolitical aims move forward beneath a veil of uncertainty.
This approach relied on a basic equation: militant networks might provide focused combat skills, ambushes, bombings, assassinations, and unconventional operations, while shielding Pakistan from blame. Because these factions rejected both secularism and ethnic nationalism, they appeared useful partners when confronting the BLA and similar breakaway elements across Balochistan.
Yet experiences in Kashmir and Afghanistan have backfired once directed at home. Officials within intelligence circles admit groups like JeM and LeT moved with greater caution following setbacks against the BLA. Spirits dipped. Efforts to draw in new members grew haphazard, while regathering strength took longer than anticipated by ISI planners.
The Balochistan quagmire
Nowhere is the shift clearer than in Balochistan - unlike earlier proxy ventures, this struggle unfolds within national borders. It happens domestically, not abroad, marked by an uprising officials now call a "mass movement." Because locals lead it, bringing in hardline fighters does little to help; instead, such moves backfire. Once citizens turn against authority, outside extremists only deepen resistance.
Despite years of tension, backing for the BLA remains strong among locals, fueled by persistent complaints about unfair resource extraction, exclusion from power, and weakened trust due to mistreatment claims. For generations, advocates from Balochistan have pointed fingers at Pakistan's authorities, alleging covert operations run by FTFs, terrorists and lawbreakers targeting dissenting voices. Turning to hardline faith-based factions to crush a non-religious independence push widened distrust across communities. Resentment grew further as such tactics handed opponents vivid stories to circulate.
Despite their presence, jihadist factions grapple with internal weaknesses. Low spirits mark many cells, as enlistment dwindles amid growing hesitation to accept operations prone to humiliating failure. Assignments once embraced now carry reputational risk, making participation less appealing. Younger candidates tend to bypass groups seen as sidetracked by local conflicts instead of focused on founding beliefs.
The international dimension
Midway through 2025, Islamabad won backing from Washington to label the BLA a foreign terrorist group, bringing them under OFAC’s SDN list, an outcome shaped by shifting diplomacy under former President Donald Trump’s outreach efforts. Still, trust erodes when one considers how closely Pakistani elements work alongside militant networks at home. That recognition gains weight because cooperation happens even as official channels condemn such violence abroad. Behind closed doors, support for insurgent tactics blurs the line between ally and enabler. The act of naming terrorists publicly means little if covert partnerships persist beneath the surface.
It stands out clearly: Pakistan claims to lead the battle on terror even as it backs militant outfits targeting internal threats. Not everyone misses this double standard. Its former defense chief admitted pulling fighters from religious schools to wage what he called America’s covert conflicts across South Asia, but still, US funding flows heavily, labeling Islamabad a key partner.
Even as Pakistan works alongside China through the Belt and Road Initiative’s CPEC, ties with the US hold steady though that corridor weakens American influence in the region. Watching regional shifts closely, Washington aimed for oversight, yet ended up fueling a force now tangled among opposing threats.
A plan born of last resort
Desperation shapes decisions when jihadist groups get used to fight the BLA. Relying on outlawed militants signals defeat, even if borders seem to stay intact. Military force, direct or indirect, fails in Balochistan because weapons do not address core complaints. At its heart, the unrest stems from unresolved political demands, not mere insurgency.
Pulled into a loop of its own design, Pakistan’s power structure faces consequences long delayed. For years, those factions were encouraged, and now they resist being used where public rebellion grows strong. What once worked abroad falters at home; battling local believers feels unlike past efforts across borders. These actors see a shift; they know the front has changed, even if their backers do not.
Mistakes made and counting
One misstep follows another when Islamabad sticks to backing proxies in Balochistan. Political inclusion, fair growth, yet recognition of local rights matter far more than arming new fighters. Because every time terror becomes policy, unrest grows sharper. Instability feeds on itself, drawing the state nearer to the breakup its leaders say they dread.
One way to counter terror is not through backing those who spread it. The US, along with global actors, should rethink its endorsement of Pakistan’s version of counterterror efforts. Stability rarely grows where deception thrives. Supporting militants while claiming opposition to violence makes little sense. Behind every claim of ignorance lies a pattern of deliberate choices.
Pakistan's dangerous experiment in Balochistan proves an enduring truth: terrorism, once unleashed, cannot be easily controlled or redirected. The forces Pakistan nurtured for external adventures have come home, and the bill for decades of proxy warfare is now coming due.
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(Vipul Tamhane is a counter-terrorism expert and governance consultant)
The views expressed are not necessarily those of The South Asian Times
