Turning off the tap: How India’s Indus reset is drying up Pakistan’s fields

Monday, 09 Jun, 2025
PM Narendra Modi's message to Pakistan after the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. (Graphic courtesy: MyGovIndia)

By K S Tomar

By engineering a calibrated disruption in water flows, India has exposed the Achilles’ heel of Pakistan's agrarian economy.

When Ismail Serageldin, then Vice President of the World Bank, warned in 1995 that “the wars of the next century will be fought over water,” many dismissed it as alarmist rhetoric. But nearly three decades later, his words echo with chilling clarity across Asia’s most volatile frontiers. As rivers dry, glaciers retreat, and populations surge, water has morphed from a shared resource into a fiercely contested geopolitical weapon. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, similarly, foresaw that the control of water, especially in arid and densely populated regions, could become a flashpoint for armed conflict in the 21st century.

This prophecy is now taking shape in South Asia, where India, Pakistan, and China — three nuclear-armed neighbors — are locked in uneasy coexistence over shared river systems. The spectre of a water war is no longer theoretical. From China's upstream ambitions on the Brahmaputra, to India’s re-evaluation of the Indus Waters Treaty, besides keeping it in abeyance after the Pahalgam attack, and Pakistan’s mounting fears of parched fields and failed crops, hydro-politics has entered the national security calculus. With diplomacy fraying and climate stress mounting, Asia’s rivers could well become the trenches of tomorrow's conflict.

The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025 — where 26 Indian tourists and one Nepalese national were massacred on communal lines by militants in Baisaran meadow — has not only shaken the conscience of India but also jolted the fragile foundations of South Asia’s most enduring water-sharing agreement: the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960. India's decision to place the treaty "in abeyance" marks a paradigm shift — water, once a bridge of peace, is now an instrument of geopolitical deterrence.

This dramatic policy change, though temporary on paper, has begun to deliver chilling consequences on the ground, particularly in Pakistan’s agricultural heartlands that thrive on the Indus River system. With India halting the sharing of hydrological data and beginning regulatory actions to maximise its own use of the Western Rivers, Pakistan is staring at a looming agricultural and humanitarian crisis.

Immediate fallout: A parched Pakistan

By halting data sharing and beginning technical preparations for more intensive water utilisation upstream, India has triggered water insecurity across Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh provinces, which are heavily dependent on timely river flows from the Indus system for their Kharif sowing cycle.

Agricultural impact | According to Pakistan’s Ministry of National Food Security, the Kharif season (April–July) accounts for nearly 65% of Pakistan’s annual crop output, and nearly 85% of Kharif sowing relies on irrigation from Indus-fed canals. In Punjab, which contributes over 70% of Pakistan’s wheat and 50% of its sugarcane, sowing of rice and cotton has already been delayed by three to four weeks due to reduced canal water availability.

Sindh, where sugarcane, cotton, and paddy dominate, is reportedly facing a 30?cline in irrigation water availability, according to the Indus River System Authority (IRSA). Satellite imagery and NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) trends from early May show a 14?crease in crop intensity compared to last year’s average.

Farmers in Okara, Multan, Bahawalpur, Jacobabad, and Larkana have staged protests, citing unviable crop conditions, wilting seedlings, and groundwater depletion, as tube wells run dry due to a lack of recharge from river seepage.

India's strategic moves: Water retention, diversion, and delay

India has not technically “cut off” river flows — a violation that would breach the treaty and provoke global backlash — but has recalibrated its usage rights within legal bounds.

Future Indian plans | India's Ministry of Jal Shakti and Central Water Commission have drafted a blueprint that includes: Construction of seven small hydropower projects (totalling 1,800 MW) on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers within IWT parameters. Expanding irrigation in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab using stored waters. Setting up real-time satellite monitoring to ensure no backflow of excess water into Pakistan during lean periods. A top official remarked off-record, "Water has now become part of our strategic deterrence doctrine."

Measures already undertaken | India has ceased real-time river flow reporting and flood alert sharing — a move that has left Pakistan's National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) blind during the monsoon season. Historically, 90% of early flood warnings in Pakistan came from Indian telemetry inputs.

Storage utilization | India has fast-tracked the filling of storage reservoirs on the Jhelum (Tulbul Navigation Project) and Chenab (Baglihar and Ratle dams), potentially delaying flow by 15–20 days.

Diversion projects | Work has been accelerated on the Shahpur-Kandi dam on Ravi and the Ujh multipurpose project, both intended to store waters that would otherwise flow into Pakistan, effectively utilising the 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) India is entitled to but previously left unused.

Strategic implications: Water as a lever of peace or pressure?

India’s evolving stance reflects a shift from moral restraint to conditional reciprocity. The new doctrine aims to convey that cross-border terrorism will no longer come without cost — economically, diplomatically, and now hydrologically.

This strategy is not unprecedented. Post-Uri in 2016, India had hinted at reviewing the treaty. After Pulwama in 2019, water diversion on the Ravi began. But the current move after Pahalgam — placing the treaty in abeyance — is by far the most assertive posture, signalling that terrorism and treaty sanctity cannot coexist.

Anatomy of Indus Waters Treaty: From cooperation to coercion

Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty allocated 80% of the river system's waters to Pakistan — comprising the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers — while India retained control over the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. India was allowed non-consumptive uses such as irrigation, hydropower generation, and navigation on Western Rivers, but its compliance had traditionally been conservative to preserve diplomatic stability.

However, India’s tolerance has reached its elastic limit. In the wake of repeated terror strikes linked to Pakistan-based outfits, the suspension of IWT cooperation, especially in terms of hydrological data sharing, flow management, and prior warnings of flood surges, signals a major realignment. This time, India's strategy is not just rhetorical — it is hydraulic.

Conclusion: Tides of reckoning

By engineering a calibrated disruption in water flows, India has exposed the Achilles’ heel of Pakistan's agrarian economy, which is dangerously water-intensive and politically fragile. The crisis brings into focus not only the vulnerability of Pakistan's food and water security but also the urgent need for Islamabad to dismantle the terror infrastructure it nurtures.

Unless Pakistan rethinks its Kashmir strategy, the days of abundant Indus waters may be numbered. What began as a diplomatic freeze may evolve into a full-spectrum hydro-strategic doctrine. For India, the message is unequivocal: Terror and treaties cannot flow together.


(The writer is a senior political analyst and strategic affairs columnist)

The views expressed are not necessarily those of The South Asian Times